Research

This study examines how citizens’ understanding and opinions of the European Union are shaped by information about the distribution of competences between the EU and member states. In a survey experiment conducted across 12 European countries, we randomize two factors: (1) the assignment of respondents to policy domains that vary in the level of EU competence, and (2) the provision of information about the division of competences between the EU and national governments. We argue that providing this information will not only increase the accuracy of responsibility attributions but also, as a result, influence public understanding and support for European integration. In addition, we suggest that the impact of information on clarity of responsibility varies, depending on several policy-related, national, and individual factors. Specifically, we expect greater improvements in the accuracy of responsibility attributions in less politicized policy areas and in those that affect member states asymmetrically. Moreover, we anticipate larger effects in member states with a higher degree of integration. We also expect stronger effects among respondents with moderate political knowledge, moderate political ideologies, weaker loyalties to nationalist-conservative parties, or favorable views of the EU’s performance relative to their national government. The findings will provide insights into the microfoundations of EU attitudes and offer strategies for bridging the gap between citizens and EU institutions.

How do citizens form their opinions on international trade? A growing body of literature in international political economy has employed informational experiments to explore whether personal economic well-being or non-economic concerns shape trade views, yet these studies often target incorrect parameters and rely on imprecise information treatments. I introduce a comprehensive framework for studying trade opinion formation that diverges from conventional experimental methods by explicitly measuring beliefs, documenting the entire trajectory of belief and opinion changes, and providing precise information interventions. Using a survey experiment on a nationally representative sample of Americans, I show that, despite widespread misperceptions, respondents are able to form more accurate beliefs, in a manner consistent with rational (Bayesian) updating, when given expert information about the economic consequences of trade. Moreover, information affects stated support for trade policies only through its impact on beliefs. I further offer the evidence that the impact of economic self-interest on trade opinion is at least as significant as that of non-economic factors. In addition, I find that non-economic factors like party affiliation, race, and the identity of the trading partner do not result in biased information processing.

Does the implementation of redistributive policies lead to increased support for free trade policies? Empirical evidence on the micro-level implications of the compensation hypothesis, in particular whether government redistributive welfare spending shapes individual views on trade liberalization, remains elusive. I argue that the validity of the hypothesis rests on the assumption that individuals recognize compensatory programs as substitutes for trade restrictions in mitigating the risks posed by globalized markets. In a survey experiment on a nationally representative sample of about 5,000 Americans, I show that individuals, especially those negatively affected by trade, perceive trade restrictions and compensatory policies as complements rather than substitutes. Moreover, I find that preferences for trade and compensation are invariant to the generosity of compensation programs. These findings suggest that broad support for free trade policies cannot be achieved through more generous compensation efforts. This paper calls for revisiting the compensation hypothesis.